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Abstract 
The paper presents an effort to incorporate geographic and other possible exogenous 
constraints that might be imposed on districting into an optimal partisan gerrymandering 
scheme. We consider an optimal districting scheme for a party which maximizes the 
number of districts that it will, in expectation, win, given arbitrary distributions of voters 
and party supporters over the electoral territory. We show that such a scheme exists if 
an equal size requirement is the only constraint imposed on districting. If, further, the 
requirement of territorial connectedness is imposed, the optimal districting scheme still 
exists when arbitrarily small deviations from the equal size requirement are admissible. 
Additional constraints imposed on districting make gerrymandering more difficult and 
sometimes irnpossible. Although the party is assumed to ignore the risk associated with 
possible shifts in electoral votes and thus takes the expected share of votes as a perfect 
predictor of electoral outcomes, the presented approach is valid for a party with any 
attitude towards risk and for any kind of majority rule used in elections. The results are 
consistent with earlier findings on unconstrained optimal partisan gerrymandering. 
How To Gerrymander: A Formal Analysis 
Katerina Sherstyuk* 
1 Introduction 
While the scientific debate over multiple criteria that should be used to provide for fair 
districting is neverending among political scientists (Balinski and Young (1982), Grofman, 
Lijphart, McKay and Scarrow (ed. ) (1982), Cain (1984), Grofman (ed. ) (1990), Butler
and Cain (1992)), in practice contiguity and population equality continue to be the
most important requirements for any redistricting process. What possibilities do these 
requirements leave for deliberate gerrymandering by particular interest groups or political 
parties? This is the problem that we address in this paper. Taking the viewpoint of a 
political party in charge of the redistricting process, we ask the question: how should the 
gerrymandering party proceed, given the restrictions that are imposed on districting? 
And, further, what can be clone to prevent gerrymandering? 
We take a formal approach to gerrymandering. While certain gerrymandering tech­
niques such as "concentration gerrymanders" and "dispersal gerrymanders" (Owen and 
Grof man ( 1988)) are well understood and commonly recognized in the literature, few
studies treat the issue as an optimization problem for the group in control of the re­
districting process. The approach we present in this paper is in many respects related 
to Owen and Grofman (1988), who analyze optimal gerrymandering schemes for a risk­
averse party in an uncertain world. They consider two possible cases: one in which a party 
maximizes its expected seat share, and another where a party maximizes the probability 
that it will·-win-a·· legis1ative�raaj@rity. Tf.i.5y-fi.ncl·tk&t-t-hfr·0ptimal-part-isan -gerrymander 
in both cases looks much like a bipartisan gerrymander, with one set of districts having 
majorities for the controlling party (we call them the "winning" districts) and the other
concentrating the opposition party supporters (the "losing" districts). Specific character­
istics of the winning and losing districts, they find, depend on the type of uncertainty the 
*I would like to thank Richard McKelvey, Kim Border, and Morgan Kousser for their help and 
suggestions. Any errors are my own. 
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party faces and the party's attitude towards risk. If the gerrymandering party is risk­
neutral or faces no uncertainty, an optimal gerrymandering scheme involves spreading 
the party supporters among a maximal possible number of winning districts which are 
carried by a bare majority. Increased degree of uncertainty and a higher degree of risk­
aversion cause the party to form fewer winning districts with the higher concentration of 
party supporters and, hence, higher probability of winning. 
Defining the "ideal" characteristics of winning and losing districts is the first step in 
the optimal gerrymandering scheme. Implementing the ideal scheme on a given territory 
is the second, and often a more difficult one. Geographic constraints and the cotiguity 
of districts requirement, if imposed, may present considerable obstacles in drawing the 
map with a set of desirable characteristics. Theoretical possibility of implementing the 
latter step is the main subject of this paper. 
In what follows, we try to incorporate geographic and other exogenous constraints 
that might be imposed on districting into an optimal gerrymandering scheme, paying 
special attention to the population equility and contiguity (connectedness) requirements.
We consider the possibility of an optimal districting scheme for a party that maximizes 
the number of expected winning seats for itself in a legislative body, with the distribution 
of the voters over the territory exogenously given. We show that such a scheme exists 
if a population equality requirement is the only constraint imposed on districting for 
any continuous distribution of population. If, further, the requirement of territorial 
connectedness of every district is present, the optimal districting scheme still exists if 
arbitrarily sma.11 deviations from the equal size requirement are admissible. 
We further show that imposition of additional requirements on districting, such as 
ethnic fairness (in the sense of equality), makes realization of the optimal gerrymandering
scheme more difficult and sometimes impossible. Thus, the imposition of multiple criteria 
for districting might be useful in preventing strategic manipulation of electoral outcomes, 
even if it does not always guarantee fair representation. 
To illustrate the details of the districting procedure, we take the case of a party 
which is not concerned with possible shifts in electoral votes and thus takes the expected 
vote share as a perfect predictor of future electoral outcomes. Yet, one could view 
the procedure we propose more generally, as the one which shows the possibility of 
implementing any feasible districting scheme on a territory with given characteristics, 
once the desirahle characteristics of the map a.re determined. 
Section 2 presents the general existence theorems, followed in Section 3 by an example 
of optimal districting for the case of a uniform distribution of voters and a single-peaked 
distribution of partisans over the territory. Conclusions and possible extensions are 
presented in Section 4. 
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2 Optimal districting for arbitrary distributions of 
voters' characteristics 
Consider the problem of a political party (or its agent) which is entitled to divide a
given territory BC R2 into k voting districts. Assume the party maximizes the number 
of districts which it will, in expectation, win in the election. Suppose that the number of 
districts, k, is given and the districts must be equal in population. T? state the problem
formally, consider a measurable space (B, B), where B is a a-algebra of subsets of B. 
Let µ denote the Lebesgue measure of population size defined on B such that µ( B )  = 1. 
Then the equality of population requirement imposed on i-th district Mi , i = 1, .. , k, can 
be presented in the form: 
µ(Mi) = 1/k , 
and we can introduce the following notions: 
Definition 1 Given a territory B C R2 and a number k, a map M = {M1, .. ,Mk} zs a 
collection of k subsets of B satisfying1
1. M; E B for all i = 1, .. , k; 
2. M;° U 1\1] = 0 for any i =/:- j, i, j = 1, .. , k;
Definition 2 Let the population equality be the only constraint imposed on districting. 
Then a feasible map is a map M that satisfies 
µ(M;) = 1/k for every i = 1, .. , k . (1) 
Suppose that each point x of the territory B is characterized by the expected share 
of votes f ( x) that the redistricting party will get in the election. Assume that the 
distribution of voters over the territory as well as the expected vote share f(x), x E B, 
are continuous, exogenously given and cannot be affected by the way the district lines 
are drawn. Suppose the simple majority rule is used in the elections within each district. 
Under these-assumpt-icms"and i.Hhe--part:)"is ·maX>im.rnrng-the-rmmherof--di-stricts which it 
will, in expectation, win, how should the party draw a districting map? 
Under these assumptions, the problem is similar to the divide-a-cake problem studied 
by Du bins and Spanier (196 1 ), and specifically to the "problem of the Nile." Dubins and
1 Hereafter, we use the standard notation Sand S0 to denote the closure and the interior of a set S, 
respectively. 
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Spanier present a solution to the problem of partitioning a set into k pieces and then 
evaluating each of n measures on each piece. In this paper, we apply their approach to 
the districting problem. 
Consider how the redistricting party2 might reason. The party expects to win the 
election in a district if its expected share of votes there exceeds one half. It is reasonable 
to assume that the party will not want the expected share of votes to be much greater 
than one half, since that would mean "wasting" votes for that party, that could help to 
carry other districts. Formally, we introduce the following definiton. 
Definition 3 A district M; is called winning if E(f(x)/M;) > 1/2.
We further assume that the party will want to draw the district lines in a way that 
will yield the maximum possible number of winning districts. That is, 
Definition 4 For any map M, define the set of the winning districts I ( M) as 
I(A1) = { i lE(f (x)/111; ) > 1/2} . (2) 
Then let the seat value of the map m(  M) be the number of winning districts, z. e. the
number of the elements in the set I: 
m(A1) = I I I . (3) 
Definition 5 A seat-maximizing map is a feasible map that maximizes the number of 
winning districts. Let {SM} denote the set of all seat-maximizing maps.
Assumption 1 (seat-maximization) The party prefers any seat-maximizing map to any 
map that is not seat-maximizing. 
Together with the requirement of equal district size, this reasoning implies that the 
party will want to find the largest possible area (with respect to population) A con­
tained in B such that the expected share of the votes over this area exceeds one half: 
E(J(x)/A) > 1/2. This region will be then adjusted and divided into m winning dis­
tricts in a way that will conform to the imposed equality of population constraint. If the 
party cares only about the number of districts that it will, in expectation, win, then the 
2We will refer to the redistricting party hereafter simply as "the party", since the whole analysis is 
presented solely from its point of view. 
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problem of finding a seat-maximizing map trivially has a solution since its objective func­
tion is integer-valued. However, if the party is not indifferent among all seat-maximizing 
maps, a special procedure should be desined to construct the most preferred, among 
seat-maximizing, maps. We impose the following additional assumption on the party's 
preferences. 
Assumption 2 (lexicographic preferences) Among the set of all seat.,..maximizing maps, 
the party prefers a map which solves 
max [ min E(J(x)/Mi)] ME{SM} iEl(M) (4) 
Thus, although the party considers every district with the expected share of votes 
above one half to be winning, it prefers to draw a map in a way that will keep the 
expectation of votes in the winning districts as high as possible, as long as it does not 
decrease the number of winning districts. We summarize the party's preferences in the 
following definition of an optimal map. 
Definition 6 An optimal map M* = {A1, .. , Ak} is a seat-maximizing map that solves
(4).
After the winning districts are drawn, the rest of the territory will be divided into 
n losing districts. (Note that given the above assumptions, it should not matter for
the party how the losing districts are drawn). The number of districts m and n will be
determined to meet the equal size requirement, and so that m + n = k. Observe that
if m > n, the party may secure, in expectation, the majority of seats in the legislative
body. 
We now turn to the first proposition of the paper, which formalizes the above reasoning 
and proves the existence of an optimal map. 
Proposition 1 There exists an optimal map M* = { A1, .. , Ak}. 
Outline of the proof of Proposition 1. Following the reasoning presented above, 
the optimal districting map can be designed in two steps. In step 1, we need to pick out 
the region A in B such that, first, the expected vote share over this region slightly exceeds 
one half, and second, A is the biggest in terms of population among all the regions that 
satisfy the first property. We further estimate the number m of winning districts by
comparing the population in A and B \A. In step 2, we partition the region A into m 
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sets of equal size in a way that preserves the expected share of the votes at the value 
higher than 1/2 in each set. After the winning districts are defined, we divide the rest of 
the territory, B \ A, into n = ( k - m) regions of equal size; these regions will constitute
the "losing" districts. 
To prove that this procedure is implementable, we apply Lyapunov's Theorem on the 
range of a vector measure, as presented in Hildenbrand (1974): 
Theorem (Lyapunov) 1 Let Vi (i = 1, . .. , m) be atomless measures on a measurable
space (!1, B). Then the set
is a closed and convex subset in Rm.
We as well use the corollary to the Lyapunov theorem which is due to Dubins and 
Spanier (1961): 
Corollary (Du bins and Spanier) 1 If each l/i is a nonatomic probability measure1
then given k and a1, .. , ak 2: 0 with :L aj = 1, there exists a partition Ai, .. , Ak of a
set U sitch that vi(Aj) = aj for all i = 1, . . ,rn andj = 1, .. , k.
First we present the following lemma3. 
Lem.ma 1 An optimal map A1* = { A1, .. , Ak}, if e:rists, satisfies
E(f(x)/A) = E(f(x)/Aj) for all i,j E I(M*) (5) 
We now turn to the proof of Proposition 1. 
Proof of Proposition 1. 
STEP L 1. 1) ...Ci.veR ...a...mes.u.r.a.ble.sp.ace {B,..B),-whm:e"B c;..R�--and-B�is-a-o--algebra of
subsets of B, a Lebesgue measure of population sizeµ defined on B, and f(x) such that
0:::; J(x):::; 1 for any x E B, find a set A= {As;;; BI E(f(x)/A) � 1/2}. Pick A* such
that µ(A*) = maxAEA [µ (A)]. To see that it is possible to find such a set A*, observe that
if the set {x  E B I J(x) 2: 1/2} is non-empty, then by Lyapunov Theorem we can find
at least one set A s;;; B such that E (! ( x) /A) 2: 1/2. Next, defining a measure T/ E R2
3The proof of lemma 1 is given in the appendix. 
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by 771(C) = µ(C) and 772(C) = fc J(x)dµ, we obtain that by the Lyapunov Theorem the
range of E(f(x)/C) = 772(C)/171(C), C � B, is compact, and so is the range of E(J(x)/C) 
constrained by E(f(x)/A) 2:: 1/2; hence there is a set A* E A  that maximizes µ(A).
Note that in generic case we will have: 
(m/k)µ(B) < µ(A*) < ((m + 1)/k)µ(B) for some m E {1, ... , k} , (6) 
which means that since we will further,need to "adjust" the set A*-to.meetthe districts' 
equality-of-size requirement (see below), the procedure in consideration may actually 
yield a set A� A* such that E(J(x)/A) > 1/2.
The only troublesome situation we may encounter is when 
µ(A*)= (m/k)µ(B) for some m E {1, ... , k} (7) 
and A* maximizes µ(A) over the set A= {A� BI E(J(x)/A) 2:: 1/2}. In this case, such
a districting procedure will, in expectation, produce a tie, not a victory over m districts; 
however, this knife-edge situation is not typical and we ignore it here. 
1.2) Find m - the number of winning districts.
'_!'o satisfy the district's equal size requirement, we need to solve the following equation 
for k1: 
fl(A*)/m = {t(B \ A*)/(k - m) (8) 
Since k1 is an integer, the number of winning districts equals the integer part of m:
m = i(m). Note that if µ(A) < (1/k)µ(B), then the number of winning districts will be
zero. The higher the expectation of f ( x ) over B and the larger k is, the easier it is to
secure more winning districts. 
1.3) Find the winning territory A.
Define the set A = {A � A* I µ(A)/m = µ(B \ A)/(k - m)}, which is non-empty
by the corollary to the Lyapunov theorem (Dubins and Spanier). Choose A E A that 
maximizes E(f (x )/A). 
This procedure corresponds to "cutting off" some parts of A* to meet the districts' 
equality of size req�irement. By assumption 3 the .Party would want to cut off the regions 
of A* with a low expected share of votes to increase the expected vote share on the rest of
A*, which will increase its probability of winning over this territory. Let E(f(x)/A) = /3,
and observe that /3 > E(f(x)/A*) 2:: 1/2.
Thus we have defined A, the territory that is to be further divided into k1 parts to 
form the winning districts. To simplify the notation, we rename A as A. This concludes 
step 1 of the proof. 
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STEP 2. Given AC R2, f(x) such that 0 ::S: J(x) ::S: 1 for any x EA, E(f(x)/A) > 1/2,
prove that there exists a partition Ai, .. , Am of A such that the following properties are
satisfied: 
( i) µ(Ai) = ... =µ(Am) = (1/m)µ(A) , 
(ii) E(f(x)/Ai) = ... = E(f(x)/Am) = E(f(x)/A) , 
(9) 
(10) 
where, as before, µ is the measure of a set's population.
To prove the above statement, we reproduce the reasoning used in the proof of lemma 
1. For any set C �A define a measure T/ E R2 by T/i(C) = µ(C), and ry2(C) = fcf(x)dµ.
Then by the Lyapunov's Theorem the set 
R = {(171(C), TJ2(C)) E R2 I c E o:} ' 
where o: is the a-algebra of A, is closed and convex. Since (0, 0) = (ryi(0), ry2(0)) ER and
(µ(A), fA fdµ) = (ryi(A), TJ2(A)) ER, we can find a set Ai CA such that
and 
and 
µ(Ai)= T/i(Ai) = (1/m)T/i(A) = (1/m)µ(A) 
1]2(Ai) = j f(x)d/J = (1/m) * j J(x)dµ. 
Ai A 
Then, by an induction argument, there exists a partition Ai, .. , Am such that
µ (Ai ) = T/i(A) = (1/m)ryi(A) = (1/m)µ(A) , i = 1, .. , m , (11) 
172(Ai) = j. J(x)dµ = (1/m) * j J(x)dµ , i = 1, .. , m .
A, A 
(12) 
Now consider the expected vote share in each Ai: 
E(f(x)/Ai) [Li f(x)dµ]/µ(A;) = [(1/m) * L J(x)dµ]/[(1/m) *µ(A)]= 
[L f(x)dµ]/[µ(A)] = E(f(x)/A) , i = 1, .. , m . (13) 
Thus we proved that the partition of A we are looking for exists, which implies, using
lemma 1, that there exists an optimal way to divide the "winning" territory into m 
winning districts. This completes step 2 of the proof. 
Finally, to define the "losing" districts, we need to divide the rest of the territory, 
B \A, into ( k - ni ) parts meeting the population equality requirement. By the corollary
to the Lyapunov theorem (Dubins and Spanier), this is implementable. 
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Q.E.D. 
Before turning to the question of the districts' connectedness, we consider whether 
imposing additional constraints on districting makes winning harder for a strategic party. 
The procedure that we have proposed allows us to predict the effect of additional equal­
ity constraints. Specifically, suppose now that the districts are required to be identical 
with respect to population size and also n other measurable characteristics such as ethnic
composition. Then generally the proposed procedure would not -work: by the corollary 
to Lyapunov theorem (Dubins and Spanier), it is possible to partition any set A � B 
such thatf(x/A) � 1/2 into m subsets A1, .. , Am in a way that all (n + l) equality
constraints will hold, but we cannot in a general secure that the additional equality con­
straints will hold between the subsets in A, {A1, .. , Am} � A  and the subsets in (B \ A), 
{Am+i, .. , Ak} � (B \ A). However, in some special cases where distributions of differ­
ent characteristics of a population are highly correlated with each other, the proposed 
procedure might be implementable. (Consider a degenerate case when all the charac­
teristics are distributed identically and are perfectly correlated; then additional equality 
constraints do not matter at all!). The higher the number of equality constraints imposed, 
the less likely it is that the proposed procedure is implementable. Thus additional equal­
ity constraints imposed on the districts make it generally harder to manipulate electoral 
outcomes. 
What can be said about other types of constraints that may be imposed on dis­
tricting? Although a formal analysis of the effect of all possible constraints is not the 
subject of this paper, we can note that generally additional constraints restrict the free­
dom of a decision-maker and thus make gerrymandering harder. On the other hand, the 
same argument shows that too many constraints might prevent "fair" districting as well 
as gerrymandering, and hence we cannot blindly welcome more restrictions instead of 
fewer. Yet in some situations constraints such as, for example, the requirements not to 
split ethnic communities or counties (if we treat them as "fairness" constraints) might 
restrict gerrymandering. As an illustration, suppose that all voters in the same ethnic 
community are either supporters or opponents of the gerrymandering party. Then the 
"not splitting" requirement will prevent the party from spreading its supporters among 
numerous districts, as it would otherwise choose to do. Unfortunately, we cannot gener­
alize this conclusion for an arbitrary distribution of voters over counties or ethnic groups. 
Rather we can conclude that effectiveness of each additional constraint will depend on 
characteristicsuf-voters'-distribution-uveriheierrii::ory. 
We now go back to our initial problem. Proposition 1 assures that there is a solution 
to the districting problem when the districts are not required to be connected. In lemma 2 
below, we show that the disconnected parts of the districts may be further connected in a 
way that nearly preserves the required characteristics of districts. The idea is to connect 
all the disconnected parts with connecting sets of infinitesimal measure of population 
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size4• Th
�n by continuity arguement we can further show that the expected share of
votes doe, not change significantly in any district, either. 
i 
Lemma t For every optimal map5 Ai, .. , Ak, for any o > 0, there exists a connected
map F1, . .  ! Fk such that
1. Eaci F; is connected, i = I, .. , k;
2. /µ(ti) - µ(A;) /< O for all i = 1, .. , k. 
Outlii�e of the Proof of Lemma 2 Suppose that the procedure described in Propo­
sition 1 h;Ji,s been implemented and we obtained an optimal partition of the set B into 
the districts Ai, .. , Ak, with each A; possibly consisting of a number of disjoint parts 
(subsets) An- To make connections possible, it is necessary for the following conditions
to be satisfied: ( i) Every Ai has a finite boundary. Since Proposition 1 does not provide
any information about the properties of the resulting districts of the optimal map, we 
cannot exclude the case that some of the sets (districts) might have infinite boundaries6; 
this may create difficulties in connecting the disjoint parts. (ii) No part of any district
forms a lo¢>p, i.e. every An is contractible. Otherwise it might be impossible to connect
disjoint pairts of a district together without cutting some other district into pieces. (iii)
No resultirp_g connected district A; forms a loop, i.e. A; is contractible. These conditions,
as we show in the proof, guarantee that it is possible to connect each of k districts to­
gether with no district cutting any other into parts; the connecting sets can be located 
along the boundaries. Hence we first adjust each set A; to meet the above conditions; 
then we construct the connecting sets. By making the adjustments and the connecting 
sets small :enough we guarantee that the total measure of population does not change 
significant]y in the districts after the adjustments are made and the connecting parts are 
added. 
Proof of Lenuna 2 By Proposition 1, there exist an optimal districting map Ai, .. , Ak 
when the connectedness requirement is not imposed. We take this map as a starting 
4N ote that this in fa.ct has been done in practice, at lea.st in some racial gerrymandering cases. I am 
indebted to Morgan Kousser for pointing out the following examples. Gomillion v. Lightfoot (364 U.S.
339) Supreme Court case (1960) considered validity of redefining city boundaries in a way that removed 
the black voters..from _its-t.ei:ri tm:y.; ,.t.he..new�.map .of the,.city-c.on_t.ained-par.ts..:that..were .c,onnected solely 
by a channel. In California, Proposition 6, passed in June, 1980, was aimed at preventing just such 
tricks (among other things). Yet a congressional district set up in 1981 was connected only by water 
(see district 6 in the Congressional district maps for the 1980s.). 
5The result of this lemma holds for an arbitrary, and not only an optimal or a feasible, map. 
6 Although a district with an infinite boundary is hard to imagine, Lyapunov theorem does not guar­
antee that the resulting subsets (districts) will always have "nice" properties, such as finite boundaries. 
Hence we need to undertake some additional steps to make sure that we can implement the districting 
procedure in question. 
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point for 
B into su 
disjoint p 
m = 1, .. ,
STEP 
R2 is a
A; cu: 
numbers 
ostruction of connected districts. Now suppose given is a partition of the set 
sets A1, .. , Ak, B = U7=1 Ai, with each of Ai possibly consisting of a number of
rts (subsets) A;= U;7;°�1 Ain, and A£nnAjm = 0 for i =/=- j or n =/=- m, n = 1, . . , Ni,
j, Ni, Nj ::_:; oo, i,j = 1, .. , k. 
Adjust each set Ai to make the boundaries finite. 
proximate each A; with a finite collection of rectangles. Observe that since 
etric space we can cover every Ai with an infinite collection of rectangles: 
1 Rim for all i = 1, .. , k. Moreover, for any l > 0 we can find {Rim}m and
i such that 
M; Af; 
µ{[( LJ Rim)\ A;] U [Ai\ ( LJ Rim)]} < l/2k for all i, (14) 
m=l m.=1 
which implies 
M; 
Jµ( LJ Rim.) - ft(Ai)I < t/2k for all i. (15) 
m.=1 
Thus e approximate every A; with a finite collection of rectangles in a way that does 
not chang the measure of the set significantly; this construction guarantees that every 
resulting s ,t Si = U��1 Rim has a boundary of a finite length. 
FIGURE 1 HERE 
1.2) Es imate the size of overlapping and remaining parts. As a result of the above 
adjustmen some of S;'s may overlap, and some parts of A;'s may be left uncovered by 
any of Si's (we will further call the latter parts the "remaining" sets). We now show that 
the overla ping and remaining parts are negligibly small in size and hence can be added 
to any district without changing its characteristics significantly. 
(i) Pro e that the the overlapping parts are negligibly small. It is sufficient to show
that 
Let ei 
from (14)
ft( S; \ LJ Sj) --t µ( S;) .as l --t O.for. .all i =. l ,-.,-k . 
jf.i 
(16) 
(Si \A;) and ri = (A;\ Si). Then by construction S; = (Ai\ r;) U ei and
ft( e;) + µ(ri) = µ[(S; \A;) U (Ai\ S;)] < l/2k , 
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which im lies that for all i 
µ( ei) < £/2k and µ(ri) < £j2k .
If Si a d Sj overlap then for any i, j = 1, .. , k, i -=f. j,
µ[Sin Sj] = 1-t{[(Ai \ ri) U ei] n [(Aj \ rj) U ej]} = 
= {[(A; \ ri) n (Aj \ rj)] U [(A; \ ri) n ej] U [(Aj \ rJ) n ei] U [ei n eJ] } = 
= [(A; \ ri) n (Aj \ rJ)] +µ[(Ai \  ri) n ej] + µ[(AJ \ rJ) n ei) + µ[ei n eJ]} = 
= [(Ai \  ri) n eJ) + µ[(AJ \ rJ) n ei] + µ[ei n eJ]}
since Ai n Aj = 0. It follows that
F IGURE 2 HERE 
Similarly we can estimate the total overlapping of all Si's: 
k k 
(17) 
(18) 
µ[ u (Sin SJ)]::; µ(LJ ei)::; Lµ(ei) < k * (£/2k) = £/2 . (19) 
i,j, if-j i=l i=l 
Hence he tota.1 size of the overlapping districts can be made arbitrary small. More­
over, since 
we obtain 
jf-i 
which pro es (16). 
(Si \  LJ Sj) =Si \  LJ (SJ n Sk) , 
jf-i j,k, jf-k 
j,k, jf-k 
> µ(Si) - £/2 -+ µ(Si) as £-+ 0 ,
j,k, jf-k 
(20) 
(ii) Estimate the size of the remaining sets. Consider the colection of remaining 
sets {rI}r, where rr denotes the remaing set adjacent to the sets Sim, {im} E I, I�
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{ ( ij) }f::{;. ·;J;';. For example, a set l{im,jn} would be the set left uncovered between Sim
and Sjn· y construction 
and henc 
r 1 C ( LJ Aim) \ ( LJ Sim) = LJ (Aim \ ( LJ S;m)) �{im}El {im}El {im}El {im}El 
c u (Aim\ Sim)� u (Ai\ Si) � u r; ' {im}El i:{im}El i :{im}El (21) 
(22) 
Now c nsider the size of all overlapping and"remaining" sets. Since from (19) and 
(22) 
we have 
[LJr1] U [ LJ (S i n S k)] � [LJr;] u [LJei] = LJ(ri u ei) ,
I j ,kJ# i i i 
µ{[LJ r1] U [ LJ (Sj n S k)]} � µ[LJ(ri U e;)] � 
I j,k,j=j:.k i 
k 
� 2:µ(r; U e; ) < k * (E/2k) = E/2 ,i=l 
(23) 
(24) 
which pro es that the overlapping and the remaining sets are very small and cannot affect 
characteri tics of any set they will be added to substantially. 
1.3) C nstruct the sets Bi with finite boundaries and such that U; B; = B .
First n te that by construction each ( S; n Sj) is a finite collection of rectangles; so
is each r1 hich is surrounded by S;'s from all sides; r/s with the parts adjacent to the
boundary f B might not wholy consist of rectangles in this part but since we can assume 
that the b undary of B is finite, r/s boundaries are guaranteed to be finite as well. 
It follo s that we can construct the sets Bi with finite boundaries in the following
way: star with the sets (S; \ U#i Sj); then arbitrarily add each (Sin SJ to either
(Si\ U#i j) or (Sj \ ui#j S;) for all i = 1, .. , k; then arbitrarily add each I[ to one of the
adjacent Sm's: ( im) E I. Then by construction 
j::f.i j ,k,jf.k 
ft(S;) - E/2 < µ(B;) < µ(S;) + E/2 ' 
lµ(Bi) - ft(S;)I � E/2 ;
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(25) 
and since from (19) we also have
I µ(Si) - µ(A;) l:S E/2k '
we finally obtain 
I µ(Bi) - µ(A;) I< E. (26) 
Thus e have constructed the sets Bi , i = 1, .. k, which cover the whole territory 
B, have fi ite boundaries and differ in size from the original sets Ai by arbitrarily small
numbers. Next, for the purposes of further construction, make every Bi open by excluding
its bound ries. Formally, for every i = 1, .. , k, take Bi = (Bi)0• We now have every
district re )resented by an open set R = u��l Bin, with population measure in all the
districts nchanged: 1-t(R) = µ(Bi ) · Besides note that now Ni < oo for all i since every 
Bi is a un on of a finite number of rectangles. 
Make all the sets Ehn, i = 1, . . , k, n = 1, .. , Ni, contractible. In case some of
Bin 's for loops around other sets, we need to break these loops with the connecting sets 
Ci of mea ure zero, µ( Cj) = 07, to make it possible to connect subsets inside and outside
loops. Sin e each Cj can be drawn along the borders of rectangles Rim, we can guarantee
that all C 's will be of finite lengths. Thus C/s are the additional boundaries created to 
make ever subset Bin contractible, and the measure of any Bi has not changed.
Denot by {Ci }f=1 the collection of all the boundaries in B, where Lis some number,
L < oo, a 1d each Cj denotes a piece of boundary of finite length which either cuts the
loop, cj Bin\ (Bin)0' or separates two neighboring subsets, Cj = B inn Bhm, for some
i # h or 1 # m. Then Uf=l Cj = B \ (U7=1 u��l Bin), where Bin's are now contractible
sets with nite boundaries, and µ( B )  = 1-t(U7=1 u��l Bin) = 1, µ( Cj) = 0 for every j. 
STEP For every district i, connect its disjoint parts. Fix an i E { 1, .. k}. Take a
minimal - with respect to the number of boundaries Cj included - set Di = (U��1 Bin) U
(Uj Cj) su h that it is connected. Minimality guarantees the absence of loops in the
resulting t. Denote by {Cij}f�1 the collection of boundaries included in Di. Next, to
give the r sulting connected district a positive measure of population size in every point, 
we need t cover all the Ci/s with sets of arbitrary small but non-zero measures. Since 
every Cij s of finite length, for any E > 0 and for every Cij, j = 1, .. , Li, we can find
a finite op n cover Eii = Uh Eiih such that each Eiih is a rectangle, . Cii c Uh Eijh andJt(Uh Eijh) < E/(k * Li). The open set Fi = ((U��l Bin) u (Uj uh Eijh))0 is now fully
connected, and its population measure does not exceed the measure of the initial set Ai 
by more tl an 2E *µ(Ai)· 
F IGURE 3 HERE 
7This si ply means that Cj 's a.re lines in R2• 
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The s me argument applies to show that the population measure on the sets from 
which th connecting sets Eij are cut does not change significantly. 
We h ve now obtained an open connected set Fi which is equivalent to the initial
disconnec ed set Ai up to an arbitrarily small deviation in population measure. The 
construct on of Fi caused the change of the boundaries but since Fi is an open union
of rectan les the new finite boundaries have automatically emerged, and the set of all 
boundari s {Ci }f =1 in B is once again well defined.
Repea the procedure described in Step 3 for all i E {l, .. k }. Observe that the total
number o connecting sets Eij, i = 1, .. , k, j = 1, .. , Li, is finite and hence the deviations
from orig nal values of population size measure can be kept arbitrary small for every 
district. 
Q.E.D. 
It is le t to show that, once the districts are connected, every winning districts is still 
winning, i e. the expectation of votes in every winning district remains on the level above 
one half. e use the following lemma to show that negligible changes in the population 
size of a s  t can result in only small changes in the expected share of votes over this set8. 
Lemma If f(x) is a continuous function on a measurable space (B, 8), then the 
expectatio of votes E[f(x)/C] on any C E 8 is continuous in the measure of pop­
ulation si e µ(C): for any C, D E 8, any t: > 0, there exists o(t:) > 0 such that 
if µ[(C \ ) U (D \ C)] < o then E[f(x)/C] - E [f(x)/D] < c In particular, any
c5 s; [c * m"n{µ(C),µ(D)}]/[2 * maxxEB f(x)] satisfies the the above requirment.
We are now in position to present the main result of the paper. 
Propositi n 2 For any E > 0, there exists c5( E ) > 0 such that the territory B can be
divided int k connected districts of o-close to equal size and t:-close in the expected vote 
share to t e optimal map. In particular, generically, the number of winning districts in 
the resulti1 g connected map stays the same as in the optimal map. 
f Proposition 2 The first statement of the proposition follows directly from 
lemmas 2 nd :3. Therefore, it is sufficient to describe the procedure that produces a 
connected ap with the same number of winning districts as in an optimal map. Take 
an arbitrarily optima.I map M* = {A1, . . , Ak}. Then by the properties of the optimal
8The pro f of lemma 3 is given in the appendix. 
15 
map (lem a 1) E[f(x)/A] = E[f(x)/Ai] for any two winning districts A, Aj. Let t:1 
denote th value 
by 
t:(M*) = E[f(x)/A] - 1/2 for some A EM* . (27) 
Then, y lemma 3, and keeping in mind that µ(Ai) = l/k for any i, define c5( t(M*))
c5(t:(M*)) -
t:(M*) 
- k * (2 * maxxEB f(x) + l(M*)) 
(28)
By le ma 2, for any given c5 > 0 there exists a connected map F {Fi, .. , Fk}
such that jµ(A;) - µ(Fi) I < c5/2 for all i = 1, . .  , k. Then by lemma 3 we have that if
jµ(Ai) - (F;)I < c5(t:(M*))/2, then
and 
lrt(F;) - µ(Fj)I < c5(t:(ll1*)) for every i, j = 1, .. , k (29) 
E[f(x)/ F;] > E[f(x)/A;] - t:(M*) = 1/2 for all i E I(M*) . (30) 
Thus £ r any cl < c5 ( t:( 111*)) /2 by lemma 2 there exists a connected map such that
jµ(Fi) - ft(Fj)I < c5 (31) 
and, for a y i = 1, . . , k, 
if E[f(x)/A;] > 1/2 then E[f(x)/ F;] > 1/2 . (32) 
Q.E.D. 
elude that generically the party can insure for itself the same number of win­
ning distri ts even if the additional connectedness requirement is imposed. 
Next e present a simple example of the suggested districting procedure.
3 T e case of a single-peaked distribution of the
ected share of votes 
Suppos the voters are uniformly distributed over the territory B C R2 and the
distributio i of the expected share of votes f ( x) that the party will get in the elections 
is single-p akecl with its peak at some point 0 in the interior of B; and suppose J(x) is
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decreasin in all directions from 0. Assume that f ( x) is continuous at any point x of the
territory, and 0 � f(x) � 1. How should the party divide the territory into k districts of
equal siz in this case? 
Given the assumption about the distribution of J(x), we might expect that the win­
ning dist icts will be concentrated around the center, so that each of them will cover 
some cen ral area with a high expectation of the vote share and then expand towards the 
border as long the expectation of the vote share in the district-exceeds one half. More 
accurate! , the party will want to find the largest possible neighborhood A of 0 in B 
such that the expected share of the votes all over this neighborhood slightly exceeds one 
half, E(f x)/A) > 1/2. This region will then be divided into k1 winning districts, and
the rest f the territory - distant from the peak 0 - will constitute k2 losing districts, 
k1 + k2 = k.
For si plicity, suppose that the territory B is a circle with the center at 0 and the 
radius R denote it by B(O; R)), and the expected share of the votes is maximal at 0, 
with f ( 0 > l /2. Let us consider the requirements on the distribution J( x) of expected
vote shar s that will allow the party to get the majority of seats in elections under these 
circumsta ces. 
Suppo e k is even. Then at least (k/2 + 1) winning districts are necessary to win
in the ele tion. Following the reasoning presented above, without loss of generality we 
can assu e that the winning districts may be drawn as k1 identical sectors of a circle 
A( O; r) w th the center at 0 and with radius r, where r � R is determined to satisfy the
condition hat the expected share of the votes over the area of each sector of A is no less 
than one alf: 
E (! ( x) I A) � 1I2 ' i = 1, .. ' ki '
where Ai enotes the i-th sector of A. Equivalently, 
or: 
[for (1/ki)7rx2 f(x )dx]/(1/ ki)7rx2 ;::: 1/2 ,
[for x2 J(x)dx]/x2;::: 1/2 . (33) 
To <let rmine the number of winning districts, the party solves the following equation 
(34) 
Equati n (:34) is the equal size of districts requirement. If the k1 that solves this 
equation i not an integer, then its integer part will indicate the number of winning 
districts. ote that in the latter case r will need to be adjusted - namely, decreased to
satisfy (33 ). 
17 
We caµ now write out the party's problem as follows: 
max k1 
subject to: 
k1 E { 1, 2, .. , k} 
(for 7rX2f(x)dx)f'rrx2 > 1/2
7rr2 /k1 = 7r(R2 - r2)/(k- ki)
The p&rty may expect to win the majority of seats in a legislative body if k1 � k/2+ 1,
that is th¢ number of winning districts will be greater than a half of the total number 
of district$. In particular, it is sufficient to have k = k/2 + 1, and thus it is sufficient to 
find r which solves: 
(35) 
and 
7rr2 / (k/2 + 1) = 7r(R2 - r2)/(k/2 - 1) . (36) 
Obvio1sly, the higher the expected value of J(x), the more easily conditions (35) and 
(36) are s�tisfied. It is interesting to note that under these conditions, to win a majority
of district$ it is sufficient to have slightly more than half a territory with slightly more 
than half f the supporters. The total share of supporters over the whole territory, or, 
equivalent y, the expected share of voters for the party necessary to win the election may 
be much 1 wer than one half. What is important for winning, though, is having a non­
uniform d" stribution of supporters over the territory, with a concentration of supporters 
in some a eas. Then the party will draw the districting map in a way that will secure 
it a maxi al number of winning districts located around the peak of the distribution of 
expected ote shares. In Figure 4, we illustrate the districting map problem for the case 
when the umber of districts k equals seven. 
F IGURE 4 HERE 
4 Conclusions
In this pa er we show that for any given territory it is theoretically possible to find a 
districting map that will in expectation maximize the number of winning districts for 
a gerryma 1dering party, under the condition that no restrictions except for the equal 
populatio of districts requirement are imposed. If the districts are required to have 
connected erritories, optimal districting is still implementable if the districts are allowed 
to vary in population size by an arbitrarily small amount. With the optimal map the 
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political arty in control of the districting process might need much less than one half of 
the electo ate's support to be able to win in a majority of seats in a legislative body. The 
party will choose to concentrate its supporters in the group of winning districts while 
leaving th other group of losing districts to the party's competitors. These findings are 
consistent with earlier results of Owen and Grofman (1988); we show that they hold not 
only for am "ideal" , but also for a geographically constrained optimal districting scheme. 
Altho4gh we have only considered the case of a party which takes expecteed vote 
share as a perfect predictor of electoral outcomes, and in in elections held under simple 
majority 11ule, the approach presented can be generalized for any m-majority rule9 or for 
a party with any attitude towards risk. For example, if the party is risk-averse or is aware 
of possibl1 shifts in electoral votes, it might want to secure the expected share of the votes 
in the winning districts at some level higher than one half depending on the degree of the 
risk-aversibn. The trade-off that the party faces then is between the number of potential 
winning dlstricts and the risk of not winning all of them. The procedure proposed here 
does not s1ubstantially change in this case except for the value of the expected share of 
votes that the party would want to secure in the winning districts. 
We are now in position to return to the question we asked in the introduction: may 
the constqt.ints on districting help to prevent gerrymandering? As we find in the paper, 
imposition of the connectedness requirement generically does not provide an effective 
controllin$ device against gerymandering: the party is able to secure for itself the same 
number of: winning districts as in the unrestricted optimal scheme. However, additional 
requiremetits imposed on districts make manipulability of electoral outcomes by means of 
districting:more difficult. Specifically, we find that the optimal gerrymandering procedure 
considered, above may not be extended to an arbitrary number of districting constraints. 
Thus by imposing extra requirements, either on the population characteristics or shapes 
of district�, an electorate might at least get more protection against possible partisan 
gerryman ering (if not more fairness). 
Consid ration of geographic constraints, when the distribution of population and 
partisan s pport is exogenously given, helps to explain why districts of unusual shapes, 
extended oo much in one direction or with narrow connecting parts included, might 
present ev dence of a partisan gerrymander. Thus we find some rational grounds for 
most peop e's understanding of gerrymandering as drawing oddly shaped districts (Butler 
and Cain, 1992). Yet one should not forget that some districts may look "funny" just
because t ey join what some redistricters consider communities of interest, or because 
the topolo y of an area is not uniform. 
Althou h it is hard to believe that the party in control of the districting process 
would use Ian abstract optimization scheme like the one we have presented, one might 
expect to nd certain real world approximations of the proposed procedure. Empirical 
9By an n -majority rule we mean a rule requiring au m-percent majority of votes to win a district. 
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consideration of electoral maps in view of our theoretical scheme suggests a subject for 
an exciting but still a different study. 
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Appendix 
Proof of Lemma 1 It is sufficient to prove that if A; E M* - optimal and i solves 
. min E(J(x )/A;) , iEJ(M*) ( 37) 
then E(J(x)/A1) = E(J(x)/A;) for all j E I(M*). Suppose there exists Aj, j E I(M*),
such that E(J(x)/A;) < E(J(x)/A1). Then for any set C �(Ai UA1) define a measure
T/ E R2 by ry1(C) = µ(C), and ry2(C) = fc J(x)dµ. Then by the Lyapunov's Theorem the
set 
R = {(ry1(C), ry2(C)) E R2 IC E a} , 
where a is the CT-algebra of A;UAj, is closed and convex. Since (0, 0) = (ry1(0), 172(0)) ER 
and (µ(A; U Aj), fAiuAj fdµ) = (TJ1(A; U Aj), 172(A; U Aj)) ER, we can find a a partitition
of A; U Aj into two subsets A;, Aj such that 
and 
172(A;) = hi J(x)dµ = (1/2) * L;uAj J(x)dµ ,
ry2(A1) = Li J(x)d1-t = (1/2) * L;uAj J(x)dµ .
Now compare the expected vote share in A; with the ones in A; and Af 
E(J(x)/(Ai U Aj)) = [E(J(x)/Ai) + E(f(x)/AJ))]/2 > E(f(x)/A;) (38) 
by the initial assumption; 
E(f(x)/(A;)) - [h
i
J(x)dµJ/1-t(Ai) =
and, simil�.rly, 
= [(1/2) * j4;uA; J(x)d1-t]/[(1/2) *µ(A; U A1)] =
_ 
[ { J(x)d1-t]/[µ(A; U Aj)] = }A;UA; 
E(J(x)/(A; U Aj)) , ( 39) 
E(J(x)/(Aj)) = E(f(x)/(A; u A1)) . (40) 
Thus, tlhere exists another map A = (11 * \(A; U Aj)) U (A; U A1)) that is prefered to
M* by asslunption 3. This shows that the initial map M* could not have been optimal. 
21 
Q.E.D. 
Proof of Lemma 3 Suppose we have µ[(C \ D) U (D \ C)] < o for some o > O; this
also implies µ(C \ D) < o and µ(D \ C) < o; moreover,
I µ(C) -µ(D) I = I µ[(C \ D) u (C n D)] - µ[(D \ C) u (D n C)] I = 
= lµ(C\D)+µ(CnD)-µ(D\C)-µ(DnC)]I = 
= I µ(C \ D) - µ(D \ C)J I <  0'
and µ(C) -µ(C n D) < o, µ(D) - µ(D n C) < o. Now consider the expected share of
votes on C and D: 
E[f(x)/C] - [fc J(x)dµ]/µ(C) = 
- [j J(x)d1t]/µ[(C \ D) U (C n D)] -(C\D)u(CnD) 
= [j J(x)dµJ/µ[(C \ D) + µ(C n D)] +(C\D) 
+ [ f J(x)dµJ/µ[(C\D)+µ(CnD)] =J(cnD) 
- E[f(x )/( C \ D)] * [µ( C \ D)/ µ(C)] +
+ E[f(x)/(C n D)] * [µ(C n D)/µ(C)] . (41) 
Similady, 
E[f (x )/DJ - E[f (x )/(D \ C)] * [1t(D \ C)/ µ(D)] +
+ E[f(x)/(C n D)] * [µ(C n D)/µ(D)] . (42) 
Let a= max{µ(C), µ(D)}, and b = min{1t(C),µ(D)}. Then we obtain
E[f(x )/CJ - E[f(x )/DJ �
::; {maxf(x)} * {µ(C \ D)/µ(C)} --{minf(x)} * {µ(D \ C)/µ(D)} + xEB xEB 
+{max J(x)} * {[µ( C n D)/ µ(C)] - [µ(D n C)/ µ(D)]} <xEB 
< {maxf(x)} * {o/b} + {maxf(x)} * {o/b} =xEB xEB 
= {max .f ( x)} * { 2J / b} . ( 43) xEB 
Hence for an arbitrary t: > 0, if we choose
o(t:) = [t: * min{1t(C),µ(D)}]/[2 * maxf(x)JxEB (44) 
then the c<tmtinuity requirment stated in the lemma is satisfied. 
Q.E.D. 
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Figure I. Approximating a set A; with a finite collection of rectangles S; 
• e; = S1 \ Ai 
• 'i = Ai \ Si
Figure 2. Overlapping and remaining sets : 
· / boundary divining Ai and A j•
Si 
D SJ 
• overlapping set Si n S j
D remaining set '{ . .} = ( A .  U A . ) \ ( S .  US  . )  l,j l J l J 
Figure 3 .  Connecting district's disjoint parts . 
Figure 4. Dividing a circle into seven districts: 
Ill winning districts 
losing districts 
�-
- E. l 
